We study rebate mechanisms according to which a monopolist selling a product introduces rebates as function of the volume of buyers. This enables the firm to induce payoff externalities that ordinarily do not exist. The monopoly firm sells an indivisible good to a mass of consumers with uncertain valuations corresponding to two sources of uncertainty: a systemic uncertainty corresponding to the realized quality, and an idiosyncratic uncertainty modeling the diversity of consumers' tastes. Analyzing the equilibria of the induced global game among the consumers, we show that introducing positive externality via an increasing aggregate reward program reduces the profit. Using variational optimization techniques, we identify several key characteristics of the optimal reward program: the optimal solution is a "full-refund or nothing" policy, fully reimbursing the buyers if the realized quality falls in one of the finitely many refund-eligible intervals. The number of intervals, though finite, grow unboundedly as consumers' tastes become less diverse and valuations concentrate around the true quality. While finding the optimal reward program is in general an intractable problem, we fully characterize the optimal solution in two important instances: one with constraints on the reward size and the other with bounds on the rate of change of the reward with sales volume. Despite their simple and intuitive structures, the corresponding optimal reward programs asymptotically recover the optimal solution. Our analysis sheds light on the potential role of novel technology-enabled features of crowd-based markets in developing new revenue management strategies.
valuations concentrate further around the true quality. Moreover, for any number of full-refund intervals, the expected profit from an optimally-designed reward program approaches that of the no-reward case in this regime. Given these implications, and as an alternative to the optimal solution, we analytically characterize the optimal solution in two special cases corresponding to two subspaces of the reward functions: one with a constraint on the reward size and the other with a constraint on rate of change of the reward with the sales volume. Despite their simple structures, these two reward programs perform provably-well when compared to the optimal solution; The former coincides with the optimal solution when most of the uncertainty in consumers' valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, while the latter yields a profit asymptotically approaching the optimal expected profit when uncertainty in valuations is primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality of the product.
A. Literature Review
This work is closely related to several areas in the revenue management and pricing literature, including group-buying and quantity discounts. The proposed reward program, however, offers a somewhat different strategy compared to group-buying schemes. In a group-buying scheme, buyers can receive a discount if they simultaneously purchase the product as a group. In 2010, Groupon, a major player in groupbuying industry, was named the fastest-growing company in the history of the Web by Forbes (Steiner (2010) ). Despite their stunning early rise, the industry has experienced a downfall over the past few years:
LivingSocial (Groupon's main competitor), once valued at $6 billion, was recently acquired by Groupon for $0 (Knowledge@Wharton (2017)). Groupon's stock value has dropped from a high of more than $28 in 2011 to around $4 per share today. Amazon Local, one of Groupon's competitors offering similar packages, closed down in 2015 (Soper (2015 ). Given the ups and downs of the group-buying industry, the pros and cons of their business model has been debated, discussed, and dissected, yet the future of group-buying platforms is an uncertain one.
Benefits of group-buying strategies are often pointed out as "economies of networking" and "economies of scale" in the business press (Mourdoukoutas (2012)). Along the same line, Jing and Xie (2011) suggest that the key advantage of group-buying lies in fostering Word-of-Mouth: it incentivizes the expert to act as "sales agents" and to promote the product to novice customers through interpersonal influences. Such strategies appear more suitable for relatively unknown firms, as was shown in Edelman et al. (2016) . In a related work, Zhang et al. (2016) study group-buying mechanisms by explicitly accounting for both the March 2019 DRAFT utility from shopping together with one's social circle 2 as well as the inconvenience cost due to the wait time, and show that the former usually outweighs the latter. Kauffman and Wang (2001) find evidence of the positive externality effect on customer bids using customer data from MobShop.com. Selling in large groups is also advantageous in situations involving scale economies (e.g., in restaurant's industry)
as large quantities reduce the marginal cost (Monahan (1984) ; Kohli and Park (1989) ).
In this work, our focus is on products with fixed market size and marginal cost. This enables us to single out the operational value of reward programs through their direct effect on the utilities of the firm and consumers in absence of scale economies, while setting aside second order effects such as market expansion via Word-of-Mouth and interpersonal influences. In this setting, our results suggest that discounting the price as a function of the size of buyers is not a profitable strategy.
Another approach to group-buying and threshold discounting is to view them as means of dealing with demand uncertainty. Anand and Aron (2003) and Chen and Zhang (2015) use threshold discounting to find the operative demand regime in a scenario where the seller is uncertain about the demand. Unlike our setting, however, demand parameters are assumed to be fully known to buyers. Treating the entire market as a single player with unknown type, where the type determines the operative demand regime, their results can be closely related to the seminal work of Maskin and Riley (1984) which studies optimal quantity discounting of a seller in face of a buyer with uncertain type. 3 Somewhat closer to our work is that of Marinesi et al. (2018) , where demand uncertainty is present at both ends. A seller with capacity constraints uses threshold discounting to both signal the market size to buyers and to condition offering the product during the "slow" season on the market size, hence reducing the supply-demand mismatch. 4
As noted by the authors, however, this strategy can potentially reduce the profit if the seller has no capacity constraint, as assumed in our work.
Another related body of work is the literature on referral reward programs, where the seller uses monetary rewards to motivate existing buyers to spread product information thus expanding the market (Biyalogorsky et al. (2001) ; Aral and Walker (2011); Lobel et al. (2017) ; Leduc et al. (2017)). 5 Although very similar in nature, group-buying has the advantage of stimulating a larger scale of social interaction as 2 See Mangleburg et al. (2004) and the references therein for the influence of the peers on spending more on shopping.
3 There are still substantial differences in the assumptions on the type distribution in these works. As a result, while quantity discounts in Maskin and Riley (1984) are everywhere optimal, threshold discounting strategies may not always outperform posted fixed prices as noted by the authors in Anand and Aron (2003) and Chen and Zhang (2015) . 4 Cachon (2004) also uses quantity discounts to encourage early season purchases to reduce the risk due to demand uncertainty. 5 Other word of mouth marketing strategies include creating buzz using promotions and frequent zero-pricing (see Campbell et al. (2017) , and Ajorlou et al. (2018) and references therein). it requires information sharing before any transaction takes place (see Jing and Xie (2011) for a detailed comparison of group-buying and referral reward programs). As stated before, by considering a fixed market size we set aside the second order beneficial marketing effects of the reward programs, including the market expansion via social interactions, in our analysis and fully elaborate on the operational value of such programs resulted from their direct effect on the utilities of the seller and buyers.
To summarize, while firms achieve a growth in their profit for products with an inherent positive network effect, we articulate that inducing such an effect using an aggregate reward program may reduce the profit. In particular, for sellers with a established customer base (e.g., Groupon, Amazon, Facebook), with no capacity constraints and a fixed marginal cost (e.g., many digital goods and services) and uncertain quality (or average valuation), inducing positive externality (e.g., via group discounting) is harmful to the profit of the firm. Nevertheless, incentive programs such as group-buying and referral rewards can be still beneficial due to their effectiveness in fostering word of mouth and social influence, scale economies, and reducing supply-demand mismatch under capacity constraint in situations discussed in the literature of group-buying and referral reward programs.
Along with their analytical complexity and operational challenges, technology-driven markets bring a series of useful features that were not previously available. Our work aims at developing a theory for a new generation of rebate programs that takes advantage of these new features. We use a simple, stylized model to highlight the core ideas of our proposed sales-based rebate program, which requires keeping track of the number of users of a product -a feature easy to implement today (at least for digital goods and services). Such a feature would be quite out of reach a few years ago. 6
II. MODEL
We consider a firm selling an indivisible product to a unit-mass continuum of consumers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] at an exogenous market price p. Consumers have private valuations for the product, normally distributed around an uncertain quality v which reflects the average valuation of the product in the market.
More precisely, we assume that the private valuation of consumer i is of the form v i = v + i , where i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) represents the heterogeneous idiosyncratic tastes of the consumers, and the quality v is drawn from a normal distribution v ∼ N (θ, σ 2 θ ) known to both consumers and the firm. It is instructive to note the two sources of uncertainty in consumers' valuations: i) a systemic uncertainty coming from the uncertainty in the realized quality (with variance σ 2 θ ), and ii) an idiosyncratic uncertainty resulting from the diversity of consumers' tastes (with variance σ 2 ). This results in a total uncertainty of variance σ 2 = σ 2 + σ 2 θ and a distribution v i ∼ N (θ, σ 2 ) for consumers' valuations. An agent with valuation v i makes a purchase (a i = 1) if the utility of purchase, given by u i = v i − p, is higher than the utility of not buying (a i = 0), which is normalized to zero. This decision by each agent induces a sales volume of sizeā(v) = Prob[v i > p|v] = Φ( v−p σ ) for a given realization v of the quality. The expected sales volume can be written as
The expected profit of the seller, thus, is given bȳ
Assumption 1. The market price p is set so as to maximize the ex-ante expected profit of the seller, and is given by the unique solution of
, where σ 2 = σ 2 + σ 2 θ is the variance of the ex-ante total uncertainty in consumers' valuations. 8
Our aim here is to study the effect of reward programs on the profit of the seller. The timing of the actions of agents in the model is as follows: The firm announces a reward program r : [0, 1] → [0, p] when launching the product at the market price p, which is assumed to be optimally set as in Assumption 1.
Consumers pay price p to the firm when they buy the product and receive a reward valued at r(ā) at the end of the purchase period, whereā is the ex-post sales volume.
Upon observing the price and reward program, and given the private valuations and the common public prior on the quality, agents simultaneously decide whether to purchase or not. The payoff for non-buyers (a i = 0) is normalized to zero, as before. The payoff of a purchase decision (a i = 1) is updated to
to account for the reward paid to the buyers. Consumers take actions maximizing their expected payoffs, 7 The marginal cost is normalized to zero. 8 We assume an optimally set fixed price for the product, in order to purely isolate the effect of the reward program.
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The utility of the firm offering the reward program r(·) is given by
whereā is the sales volume resulted from the strategies of the consumers and the realized quality v.
We call a reward program profitable if it yields an expected profit higher than the profit in the noreward case. A natural question which arises is whether there exists a profitable reward program at all.
One can think of a reward program as a bet between the firm and each consumer whose outcome depends on the realization of the quality. Therefore, a profitable reward program may seem out of reach, given the informational "edge" of the consumers over the firm. 9
III. PROFITABILITY OF AGGREGATE REWARD PROGRAMS
To clarify the effect of an aggregate reward program, we first start with the full-information case, where the quality of the product v is perfectly known, i.e., σ θ = 0. It is easy to verify that a reward program in this case works merely as a price discount. To see this, note that given v, consumers can correctly foresee the sales volumeā at equilibrium and subsequently adjust the price and make a purchase if and only if v i > c = p − r(ā). Therefore, the offered reward program r(·) works the same way as lowering the price from p to c = p − r(ā). This, of course, is clearly not profitable given that p is assumed to be optimally set when no reward is offered (Assumption 1).
For an uncertain quality (σ θ = 0), given the dependence of the paid reward on the aggregate size of the buyers, the offered reward program induces a global game among the consumers; To make a purchase decision, each consumer needs to form a belief on the valuations of other consumers, as well as a belief on the beliefs of other consumers on the valuations of others, and so on (cf. Morris and Shin (1998, 2003) ; Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for the theory of global games). Therefore, the first step in analyzing the profitability of aggregate reward programs is to characterize the equilibria of the sub-game among the consumers. 9 Besides the common prior on the quality v, each consumer's valuation provides her with a noisy private observation of v.
A. Monotone Bayes-Nash Equilibria of the Consumers' Subgame
The negligible effect of individual consumers on the aggregate action in continuum models makes the Bayes Nash equilibria of the game symmetric. We turn our attention here to equilibria in the class of monotone or threshold strategies. A symmetric, monotone strategy with threshold c is of the form a i = 1{v i > c}, that is, a consumer makes a purchase if and only if her private valuation is above c. The existence of such equilibria for the consumers' subgame can be guaranteed by imposing certain conditions on the reward program, as we will see later in Lemma 2 and 3.
For a monotone strategy a i = 1{v i > c}, the aggregate size of the buyers for a realization v of the
The expected payoff of adoption is therefore given as
For an equilibrium threshold strategy a i = 1{v i > c} the cutoff agent is indifferent to making a purchase or not, that is
We can write the above indifference equation
is the reward expected at the cutoff.
Each buyer is charged a "net price" of p − r(Φ( v−c σ )). The expected utility of the firm is thus given as
It is more convenient to work with reward as a function of the quality v. Given the one-to-one map between the quality and sales volume (ā = Φ( v−c σ )) for threshold strategies, we define and henceforth work withr(v) = r(Φ( v−c σ )) in the rest of the paper.
B. Monotone Reward Programs
We can gain some insight into the profitability of a reward program by writing the expected utility of the firm conditioning on consumers' valuations instead of the realized quality of the product (as in
θ is the total uncertainty in valuations. The net price expected by a consumer with valuation v i is p − E v|vi [r(v)], as already established in deriving (III-A).
Observing that the net price expected at valuation v i is the same as the expected net price charged by March 2019 DRAFT the seller at valuation v i , we obtain
where
is the ex-ante pdf of consumers' valuations in the market, and E v [Π(c, 0)] is the expected utility of the firm offering a price c with no reward. The following result follows immediately.
Lemma 1. Suppose the consumers follow an equilibrium strategy of the form a i = 1{v i > c}, given
if and only if the ex-ante expected reward paid per purchase is less than the reward expected at the cutoff, that is,
Proof. See the appendix.
The seller extracts the full surplus from the cutoff agents since the expected net price at cutoff is the same as their valuation c (recall the indifference equation c = p − r c ). Writing the expected profit of the firm as in (III-B), we can observe that the extra surplus extracted from buyers with v i > c via the reward program is the difference in the reward paid at valuation v i and that paid at the cutoff (i.e.,
. From this, it is clear that a reward program that pays higher reward at higher valuations cannot outperform an offered price c with no reward, and hence cannot be profitable.
We can show the monotonicity of expected rewards for monotone reward programs (see the proof of Theorem 1). In particular, we can show that for any increasing non-constant reward programr(·) the expected rewards are strictly increasing with consumers' valuations. As a result, any increasing reward function clearly violates the condition in (1), and hence cannot be profitable.
Theorem 1. There exists no profitable increasing reward program.
This result shows that although an inherently existing positive externality yields the seller a free gain March 2019 DRAFT in the profit, inducing it via an aggregate reward program for a product with no (or weak) network effect is indeed harmful to the profit. The rationale is that under an increasing reward program buyers with higher valuations are charged at a lower rate (in expectation), an overtly non-profitable course of action.
A decreasing reward program, on the other hand, charges a higher expected price at valuations above the cutoff. The offered reward program is hence profitable if the extra surplus extracted from the buyers via the reward program surpasses the marginal loss in profit resulted from moving the cutoff away from the optimally set price p.
C. Profitable Aggregate Reward Programs
The existence of profitable reward programs are clearly contingent on the existence of monotone equilibria for the consumers' subgame. In what follows, we first derive sufficient conditions on the reward program for the existence of such equilibria. We then characterize the optimal reward programs under such conditions. The resultant optimal reward programs turn out to be decreasing, hence simultaneously ensuring the existence of profitable decreasing reward programs.
A natural approach to certify the existence of monotone equilibria is to make the expected payoffs of the consumers increasing with their valuations, assuming a monotone symmetric purchase strategy. 10
For monotone expected payoffs, the existence of a monotone equilibrium then boils down to finding a solution for the indifference equation, which is typically easy to verify. We can ensure the monotonicity of the expected payoffs (in valuations) by either imposing conditions on the spread of the reward (as in Lemma 2), or its rate of change (as in Lemma 3).
Lemma 2. Let r min and r max denote the minimum and maximum reward paid to a buyer under the reward programr(·). Then, the expected payoff of adoption, assuming a monotone symmetric strategy for the consumers, is increasing with their valuations if
Proof. See the appendix. 10 referred to as the single-crossing property in mechanism design literature. 11 We can similarly come up with conditions ensuring the uniqueness of such an equilibrium. However, we postpone this to a later time because, as we will see in the sequel, the uniqueness condition will be trivial for the class of reward programs that are of interest.
Under this assumption on the reward range, the strategy a i = 1{v i > c} is an equilibrium if and only if the cutoff (v i = c) is indifferent between making a purchase or not, that is
The optimal reward program under this assumption is the solution to the following infinite dimensional optimization problem:
subject to:
Exploiting the log-concavity of the normal distribution, we can analytically solve for the optimal reward program, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The optimal reward programr * SC (·) with the spread constraint
The bound √ 2πσ σ σθ on the reward spread in (2) is only affected by the diversity of tastes and uncertainty in realized quality, and not the expected quality of the product θ or, equivalently, the price p. This may result in a reward which is quite insignificant compared to the offered price p. Consequently, the optimal reward program may perform poorly, especially in regimes where the uncertainty in valuations is primarily due to the uncertainty in quality of the product and not the diversity in tastes ( σ σ is small). A potential remedy is to come up with an alternative subspace of the reward programs (with monotone expected utilities for consumers) with a better performance in such regimes.
Then, the expected payoff of adoption, assuming a monotone symmetric threshold strategy for the consumers, is increasing with their valuations.
We can characterize the optimal reward program within this class of reward programs with rate of change constraint using generalized Lagrange multipliers for variational optimization problems (Ito and
Kunisch (2008)).
Theorem 3. The optimal reward programr * RC (·) satisfying the rate of change constraint
How well do the reward programs given by Theorem 2 and 3 perform with respect to the optimal reward? Can we characterize the optimal reward program and/or its structural properties? We answer these questions in the next section.
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IV. OPTIMAL SALES-BASED REWARD PROGRAM
We can formulate the problem of finding the optimal reward program as
subject to: 
where λ ∈ BV (R) is an upper-semicontinuous function with bounded variation, decreasing for x < 0 and increasing for x ≥ 0. Denote the optimal solution of (IV) with (r * , c * ). 13 The complementary slackness property requires x ∈ X . Then, we can write the Lagrangian as
whereλ
Optimality conditions can be written as:
Optimal reward program is hence a "full-refund or nothing" policy of the form
Using the first order condition for the optimal threshold c * in (A) we can find wherex = min{x|x ∈ X }. The optimal reward program is of the form
This means that the optimal reward program is a full-refund or nothing policy which refunds the full price to a buyer if the realized quality v falls in one of the l refund-eligible intervals [w j L , w j H ], j = 1, . . . , l. Having only a few refund-eligible intervals in the optimal reward program, or a measurable performance of such a reward program compared to the optimal one can be quite useful, given the non-concave infinite dimensional nature of the maximization problem in (IV). To bound the number of levels l in the optimal solution, consider consumer i with valuation v i ∈ [c, p] and let µ 
Therefore, for any δ > 0 and v i ∈ [c, p − 2pΦ( −δ σv )], we should have d(V refund , µ i ) ≤ δ. As a result 15
for any δ ≥ 0. This imposes an upper bound on the expected profit of a reward program with l full-refund intervals:
Fix the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations σ 2 = σ 2 θ + σ 2 . A choice of δ = √ σ v ensures that, for any number of levels l, the second term in the above upper bound vanishes as σ → 0 (and so does σ v = σ σθ σ ). The first term, on the other hand, has an asymptotic value of pΦ( θ−p σ ), that is the profit of the no reward case. 15 Using this and taking a few simple steps, we can prove the following properties 15 See the proof of Theorem 4 for details.
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for the optimal reward program.
Theorem 4. The optimal reward programr * (·) cast as the solution of the optimization problem in (IV)
is a "full-refund or nothing" policy of the form
where the intervals [w j L , w j H ], j = 1, . . . , l identify the qualities eligible for a refund. Moreover, fixing the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations σ 2 = σ 2 θ + σ 2 , then as σ → 0, i) the number of refund-eligible intervals l in the optimal reward program tends to infinity.
ii) for any fixed l, the expected profit resulted from the optimal reward program with l full-refund intervals approaches that of the no reward case.
Unlike the optimal reward program formulated in (IV), which is the solution of an infinite dimensional non-concave maximization problem with a continuum of constraints, the reward programs characterized in Theorem 2 and 3 have simple structures, can be characterized analytically, and are easy to implement.
To evaluate the performance of these reward programs, however, we need sufficiently tight upper bounds on the optimal expected profit.
A simple observation is that the expected profit extracted from consumers with valuation v i is capped with both the price p and v i . This leads to the following upper bound on the expected profit:
We can also obtain an upper bound on the optimal expected profit by solving a relax version of (IV), in which we only keep the constraint corresponding to the indifference equation. 16 16 Alternatively, we could use weak duality.
Then the expected profit under the optimal reward program (that is, the solution to (IV)) cannot exceed the expected profit resulted from the reward functionr(v) = p × 1{v < v c } and cutoff c, given by
We use the upper bound Π H = min(Π H 1 , Π H 2 ) for the optimal expected profit to evaluate the performance of the reward programs given by Theorem 2 and 3. This upper bound, along with the expected profit resulted from ther * SC (·) andr * RC (·) are plotted in Figure 1 for a sample choice of θ, and various allocations of the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations σ 2 = σ 2 θ + σ 2 between the two sources of uncertainty (that is, diversity in tastes and uncertainty in the realized quality). When most of the uncertainty in valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, the expected profit resulted fromr * SC (·) coincides with the upper bound on the expected profit, certifying the optimality ofr * SC (·) and tightness of the upper bound in this regime. On the other hand, as σ → 0, that is the uncertainty in valuations is primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality, the expected profit fromr * RC (·) approaches the upper bound on the expected profit, implying asymptotic optimality ofr * RC (·) as σ → 0.
Theorem 5. Fix the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations σ 2 = σ 2 θ + σ 2 . Then,
, the spread-constrained reward programr * SC (·) characterized in Theorem 2 is optimal. That is,r * SC (·) is also the solution to the variational optimization problem in (IV). ii) the rate-constrained reward programr * RC (·) characterized in Theorem 3 is asymptotically optimal, in the sense that
wherer * (v) is the optimal reward program formulated in (IV).
Proof. See the appendix. Optimal spread-constrained reward Optimal rate-constrained reward Upper bound on the optimal profit Optimal no reward profit Fig. 1 . The expected profit for the spread-constrained (r * SC (·)) and rate-constrained (r * RC (·)) reward programs characterized in Theorem 2 and 3, versus the upper bound on the optimal expected profit (Π H ) and the expected profit of the no reward case (Ev[Π(p, 0) ]), for a sample choice of θ = 5 and total uncertainty σ normalized to 1. The resultant optimal price for the no reward case is p = 3.91.
One important point that should be made here is that the optimal rate-constrained reward program of Theorem 3, which is in the form of a saturated linear function with the range [0, p] should not be attributed to the limiting behavior of the sequence of optimal reward programs {r * σ } as σ → 0. Although Theorem 4 establishes that the number of levels inr * σ goes to infinity as σ → 0, these functions are "full-refund or nothing" programs taking only values in {0, p}. Therefore, the sequence of optimal reward programs {r * σ }, as σ → 0, do not converge tor * RC , and may not even be convergent at all. The optimal reward program is a "full-refund or nothing" policy, fully reimbursing buyers if and when the realized quality lies in one of the finitely many refund-eligible intervals. As consumers' tastes become less diverse and valuations concentrate further around the quality, the number of refund-eligible intervals grows unboundedly. Moreover, in this regime, the performance of the optimal reward program for any finite number of levels degrades to utility of the no-reward case. As an alternative, we propose and characterize the optimal solutions when the reward policy lies in a particular subspace of range-constrained and rate-constrained reward programs, and evaluate their performance against the optimal solution. In particular, we show that the optimal range-constrained program coincides with the optimal solution when most of the uncertainty in consumers' valuations comes from the diversity in tastes, while the optimal rate-constrained program performs asymptotically as well as the optimal solution when uncertainty in valuations is primarily due to the uncertainty in the quality of the product.
Guoquan Zhang, Jennifer Shang, and Pinar Yildirim. Optimal pricing for group buying with network effects. Omega, 63:69-82, 2016.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Proof follows directly from (III-B).
Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove the following lemma on the monotonicity of expected rewards for monotone reward programs.
Lemma 5. Suppose the consumers follow a threshold strategy of the form a i = 1{v i > c}. Then, for any increasing non-constant reward program r(·) the expected rewards of the consumers are strictly increasing with their valuations. In other words,
Similarly, the expected rewards are decreasing with consumers' valuations for any decreasing reward program.
from which the lemma immediately follows.
Based on the above lemma, any increasing non-constant reward program violates condition (1) in Lemma 1, and hence cannot be profitable.
Proof of Lemma 2. For
Using this, it is easy to see that
, which completes the proof. Proof of Theorem 2. WLOG, we normalize the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations to 1, that is, we assume σ 2 = σ 2 + σ 2 θ = 1. Let the Lagrangian be
Recalling
we can write the first order condition for optimal cutoff c as
To find the optimal reward paid at each realization v of the quality, we use Π(p,r(v)) = (p − r(v))Φ( v−c σ ) to find the weight ofr(v) in the Lagrangian L:
Let v c be a zero of (A). Using the identity
and the assumption σ 2 + σ 2 θ = 1, we can reach at
showing the uniqueness of v c given the log-concavity of the normal distribution. It then follows that, for the optimal reward program,
where we recall that r M = min(p, √ 2π σ σ σθ ). Noting that E v|c [ µc−v σv ] = 0, first order optimality condition for c given in (A) is insensitive to r min , and combined with (A) leads to
.
The reward r min works as a discount as it is paid at all values of v. Note that although no discount is profitable when there is no reward (p is the optimal price with no reward), this does not necessarily imply r min = 0 when we allow for a joint reward program. Using (A) the total weight of r min in L is −Φ(θ − c) + λ. Therefore,
We claim, however, that having a discount is still not profitable when a joint reward is allowed. For the case p ≤ √ 2π σ σ σθ , we have r M = min(p, √ 2π σ σ σθ ) = p yielding r min = 0 from (A). Therefore, we only need to deal with the case where r M = √ 2π σ σ σθ < p. We prove r min = 0 by showing that λ < Φ(θ − c).
This clearly requires vc−c
implies that
On the other hand, using Φ(θ−c) φ(θ−c) ≥ Φ(θ−p) φ(θ−p) = p which follows from the optimality of p, we can find
Comparing (A) and (A), we can observe that
One immediate consequence of (A) and (A) is that θ − c, vc−µc σv , vc−c σ ≥ 0.
We next present the following useful lemma.
Proof. This easily follows from the log-concavity of Φ( √ x) and that φ(a)φ(d) = φ(b)φ(c).
Applying the above lemma, we can reach at
Using this in (A), we get
putting p and hence θ in the regime θ ≥ p ≥ π 2 . Another useful inequality can be obtained using the log-convexity of the function h(
Let y := vc−µc σv . Incorporating θ − c ≥ p − c ≥ r M Φ(y) in (A), we can obtain
which along with (A) leads to y φ(y) ≥ π 2 , requiring y > 1 2 . Finally, (A) and (A), along with the fact that 2 p + θ − p > 3 2 for θ ≥ π 2 and optimal price p = Φ(θ−p) φ(θ−p) , we can show
With a bit of manipulation, we can verify that the above cannot hold for y > 1 2 and σ ≥ π 2 φ(y) Φ(y) . This completes the proof of λ < Φ(θ − c), implying that r min = 0.
The last point to be made is about the uniqueness of the equilibrium threshold strategy for the subgame among the consumers under the optimal reward program. This is important, as in case of multiple equilibria seller cannot predict the purchase behavior of the consumers. More generally, we can show the uniqueness of the cutoff c for any decreasing reward program r(Φ( v−c σ )). To prove, we write the indifference equation as
where the second equality follows from combining v|c
It is easy to see that the RHS in (A) is strictly increasing in c, implying the uniqueness of c.
Proof of Lemma 3. Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, it suffices to show that | ∂ ∂vi E v|vi [r(v)]| ≤ 1. This immediately follows from
noting that | ∂ ∂vir (v + µ i )| ≤ 1 τ ∂µi ∂vi = 1. Proof of Theorem 3. Again and WLOG, we normalize the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations to 1, that is, we assume σ 2 = σ 2 + σ 2 θ = 1. Denote with P C(R; [a, b] ) the space of piecewise continuous functions from R to [a, b] . Then, d dvr (v) = −u(v) for some u ∈ P C(R; [− 1 τ , 1 τ ]), and
where r 0 := r(ā(0)) =r(−∞). We can formulate the problem of finding the optimal reward program as
The existence of Lagrange multipliers for this problem can be established using a regularity condition, March 2019 DRAFT which basically requires the linearized approximation of the constraint space around the optimal solution to have a feasible interior point (see, e.g., Definition 1.5 in Ito and Kunisch (2008) for the explicit statement of the regularity used here). Denote the optimal cutoff associated with (A) by c * . One can easily verify that forr = p − c * and c = c * all the inequalities are strict and the indifference equation is satisfied. Since the only nonlinearity in (A) (that is, cutoff) is kept unchanged, this verifies the regularity condition discussed above. Let the Lagrangian be
where λ ∈ R, and µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ BV (R) are increasing upper-semicontinuous functions with bounded variation vanishing at +∞. Denote the optimal solution of (A) with (u * , r * 0 , c * ) and the resulting optimal reward withr * (·). Optimality conditions given by Lagrange theorem are then
L(u * , r * 0 , c * , λ, µ 1 , µ 2 ) ≥ L(u * , r 0 , c * , λ, µ 1 , µ 2 ), for all r 0 ∈ R, and the complementary slackness property requires
implying that µ 1 (v) and µ 2 (v) can only change whenr is on the boundary.
Integration by part for each term in RHS of (A) using d dvr (v) = −u(v), we can recast the Lagrangian as
where µ 0 1 = µ 1 (−∞) and µ 0 2 = µ 2 (−∞). Regrouping the terms, we get
It is easy to see that
which is a decreasing function of v, thus having a unique root v c for λ > 0 and no root otherwise. This
From the optimality condition (A) and complementary slackness property (A), we can obtain
Next, we claim that
. Using the fact that µ 2 (v) is increasing and µ 1 (v) is fixed while off the boundary (i.e., whenr * (v) > 0), and that G(v) is decreasing for v ≥ v c , (A) requires the optimal reward to increase 17 at the fixed rate of 1 τ for v ≥ v 0 , hence eventually violating the constraintr * (v) ≤ p. If v 0 < v c , a similar argument shows that the resulting optimal solution violateŝ
This proves that G(v)+µ 1 (v)−µ 2 (v) ≤ 0 for all v ∈ R. Therefore, while off the boundary the optimal reward decreases at the fixed rate of 1 τ . The optimal reward stays atr * (v) = p for v ≤ v L for some
, µ 2 (µ 1 ) has to increase (increase) 18 at the same rate at which G(v) increases
. This also enforces r * 0 = p. In summary,
where,
Evaluating
hence satisfying optimality condition for r * 0 given by (A), since this zeros the coefficient of r * 0 in (A). As for the optimal cutoff, given that
we can reach at
Putting (A), (A), and the indifference equation for cutoff together we can solve for the optimal reward program as given in Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 4. Most of the proof is given above the theorem in the body of the paper, so we only fill in the gaps here:
Existence of an optimal reward program: Finding the optimal reward program as posed in (IV) involves maximizing the expected profit of the seller overr ∈ L ∞ (R; [0, p]), that is the closed half-sphere of radius p in L ∞ (R), and c ∈ [0, p]. L ∞ (R; [0, p]) is weak * compact, according to Alaoglu's theorem (see, 18 Note the sign of µ1 vs. µ2. e.g., Luenberger (1997), Page 128). To prove the existence of a global maximizer for (IV), it thus suffices to show the continuity of E v [(p −r(v))Φ( v−c σ )] in (c,r). Continuity of E v [(p −r(v))Φ( v−c σ )] is apparent from
Upper bound on the expected profit for the optimal reward program with l full-refund eligible intervals:
Argument above (IV) states that for any δ > 0 and v i ∈ [c, p−2pΦ( −δ σv )], we should have
The mass of the qualities outside V refund and within its δ-vicinity is upper-bounded by 2lδ given that V refund is the union of l intervals. As a result,
for any δ ≥ 0, which can be used to obtain an upper bound on the optimal profit as:
Fix the total uncertainty in consumers' valuations σ 2 = σ 2 θ + σ 2 . A choice of δ = √ σ v ensures that, for any number of levels l, the second term in the above upper bound vanishes as σ → 0 (and so does σ v = σ σθ σ ). As for the first term,
which is asymptotically upper-bounded by Φ( θ−p σ ) as σ → 0. This, along with (A) shows that the expected profit for the optimal reward with l full-refund intervals approaches that of the no reward case (that is, pΦ( θ−p σ )) as σ → 0. To complete the proof, we only need to show that the optimal reward program yields a nonzero gain over the optimal no reward as σ → 0. This is immediate, comparing the upper-bound Π H 1 in (IV) with the optimal no reward profit, and that the expected profit fromr * RC (·) approaches Π H 1 as σ → 0. Proof of Lemma 4. Choosing λ(x) = λ 0 × 1{x ≤ 0} in (IV), we get the Lagrangian for the relaxed problem in which we drop all the constraints except for the indifference equation:
Recalling the identity
which yields
We can characterize the optimalr(·), similar to Theorem 2, by looking at the weight ofr(v) in (A),
. Using a similar approach, this leads tor *
where v c is the unique solution of λ 0
The optimal expected profit for the relaxed problem is thus
The proof is now complete on noting that the optimal profit for the relaxed problem serves as an upper bound on the optimal profit for the original problem.
Proof of Theorem 5. i) When σ σθ ≥ p √ 2πσ , the optimal solution to the relaxed problem characterized in Lemma 4 coincides with the optimal spread-constrained reward program characterized in Theorem 3, making them both optimal.
ii) We prove this by showing that the expected profit resulted fromr * RC (·) approaches the upper bound Π H 1 as σ → 0, proving the asymptotic convergence of both to the optimal expected profit. Using the characterization ofr * RC (·) in Theorem 3, we can show that as σ → 0, then c → 0, v L → 0, v H → p.
On the other hand, E v|vi [r * RC (v)] →r * RC (v i ) as σ → 0. As a result,
which is the same as the upper bound Π H 1 given by (IV).
